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A revolution in information exchange is underway. The convergence of
computer and communication technologies, sometimes called "telemat-
ics," "compunications," or "teleinformatics," 1 is making it possible for
information in many forms to be transmitted instantly and cheaply be-
tween any two points on the globe. The technological means to establish
a universal, international communications network linking all mankind are
within reach. Indeed, many pieces of this network already exist.
The international exchange of data and information through this global
communication network constitutes an increasingly important element of
world trade and a major source of future economic growth. This rising
international flow of data and information is also increasingly a preoccupa-
tion of governments concerned about privacy, national security, cultural
independence and domestic industrial development. 2 The challenge that
faces national policymakers is to maximize the benefits derived from the
free exchange of information while at the same time guaranteeing the
national security and the social and cultural integrity of their countries.
Finding the proper balance between openness and regulation is difficult
but crucial.
Because restrictions on trade in communication and information ser-
vices distort trade, impair growth, and hamper innovation, we believe that,
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as a general rule, countries should try to promote free trade in telecom-
munications, data processing, and information services to the greatest ex-
tent possible. Our aim in this article is to outline an approach that could
help minimize protectionist barriers that threaten the free flow of informa-
tion across national borders. To do so, we suggest ways to distinguish
between protectionist and "legitimate" reasons for imposing policy meas-
ures that may impede trade in communication and information services.
Our argument unfolds in three parts. Section one highlights some of the
changes that the revolution in information exchange is producing. It also
argues that transborder data flows could help facilitate international eco-
nomic adjustment. Section two analyzes the types of reasons used to
justify policy measures that inhibit the integration of the world communi-
cation network or prevent information from flowing across national bor-
ders. It also discusses the implication of restrictions on transborder data
flows for the world trading system and for world economic growth. The
final section discusses strategies for halting the proliferation of barriers to
trade in communication and information services and for reducing existing
obstacles.
THE NEW INFORMATION ECONOMY
Before telegraph and telephones, information had to be manually trans-
ferred from one place to another. Diplomacy and commerce were trans-
formed by the capability to transmit information over wires. The
introduction of radio and television accelerated the pace of change still
further. In the past forty years, communication possibilities have multi-
plied as modem technology has brought down the cost and increased the
speed and reliability of communications and as computers revolutionized
storage, processing and retrieval of data. Computing and communication
costs have fallen dramatically as computational power and ease of com-
munications have increased. New breakthroughs continue to transform the
communication network and speed the exchange of information world-
wide. 3 Some examples follow:
(1) In print journalism, articles can be written in one country, edited and
mocked up in a second, typeset by computers in a third, and then transmit-
ted by satellite for printing halfway around the world. 4 Ultimately, it may
be unnecessary for publishers to print books, magazines, or newspapers.
Updated information could be entered into data banks with access gained
instantly from home or office terminals.
(2) As for education, lessons can be transmitted, live or taped, by short-
wave or television, to rural areas lacking qualified teachers. Even the need
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to gather for classes might in many cases be eliminated when students can
"tune in" to prerecorded classes.
(3) The existing global data processing network also permits engineers
in Pakistan to produce architectural drawings, Indian computer program-
mers to write computer software, and coders and keypunch operators
working in Barbados all to transmit their work to companies in North
America almost instantaneously.
(4) Consumer data bases have markedly changed commerce and tou-
rism. In 1959 Bankamericard (now Visa), the first universal system for
providing consumer credit, was introduced in California. Today, American
Express, Visa, Master Charge, and other charge cards are accepted as means
of payment for goods and services throughout the world. We will soon be
able to verify the availability of funds and transfer them between the
accounts of buyers and sellers wherever the funds may be held. 5
(6) Finally, innovations in banking, such as the introduction of Electron-
ic Funds Transfer Systems (EFTS), and the creation in 1973 of the Society
of Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) have
speeded the transfer and reduced the cost of moving information and
funds between domestic branches and across national borders. Both of
these systems have transformed the business operations of banking and
other financial institutions. International banking on its present scale could
not exist without them. 6
Developments such as these will speed economic growth, create new
jobs, spread education, and make more information available to more
people. But the new technologies also appear threatening to many. 7
Change in itself tends to be upsetting. Beyond that, governments fear the
loss of national control. As technical barriers to the international move-
ment of information fall, all countries become more interdependent and
some national control is lost. Governments are trying to grapple with the
problem of managing the new abundance of information. They want to
adapt, but not too quickly. To slow the process of change and adaption,
some countries are imposing new regulations to control information flows.
Most government officials also recognize that telematics and high tech-
nology-based industries will be important to future economic vitality.
Many industrial countries, France and Japan being prominent examples,
are trying to promote their future prospects by subsidizing and in some
cases protecting industries of the future. Several advanced developing
countries, such as Brazil, hope to insure that they do not fall too far behind
in developing these new industries. Both types of countries are thus tempt-
ed to try to stimulate and protect the development of their own domestic
information industries. 8
148 REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS
REGULATION OF TRADE IN INFORMATION
AND COMMUNICATION SERVICES
One way in which governments attempt to control the rate and kind of
change is by limiting electronic access to computer data banks abroad or
by limiting the extent to which foreigners can use communication channels
for providing information or communication services. Actions of these two
types slow change and hamper economic growth. Assessing the costs and
benefits is the job of politicians, but, to make such decisions sensibly,
politicians must balance the need to protect political, social, and cultural
values against economic benefits.
It is useful first to describe the main types of obstacles to transborder
data flows and the reasons articulated for imposing them before judging
the economic and trade implications of these actions.
Types of Regulations
Regulation of International Data Flows
Many countries have adopted policy measures that either prohibit the
inflow or outflow of certain kinds of information or effectively raise the
cost of transmitting information across national borders to such a high
level that the flow is reduced. Regulations or taxes can limit the transmis-
sion of data across borders, either by purposeful design or as an unintended
result. By raising the cost of doing business or by increasing the uncertain-
ty associated with doing business, transmission of information across ex-
isting communication lines will be curtailed. For example, the French have
suggested that they might tax the value of data that is imported into
France. This would require expensive modifications of encoded data which
would make the price for foreign enterprises doing business with France
prohibitive. 9 Similarly, several European Postal, Telegraph, and Telephone
(PTT) monopolies have, from time to time, suggested that they might
charge for the use of private leased lines on a volume-sensitive basis
instead of at a fiat rate. 10 Users calculate that this could increase the cost
of transmitting data by as much as 700 percent, making many current
operations uneconomical to maintain. 11
Competition with Communication Monopolies
Friction often develops between government authorities choosing to oper-
ate through government owned or controlled PTTs and foreign providers
of data services or value-added communication services. Governments
sometimes choose to limit the number of foreign suppliers of information
services as well as the scope of services that may be provided. 12 For
example, many countries restrict or ban the shared use and resale of private
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line for fear that foreign companies would divert business from the gov-
ernment PTT. 13 Such measures may increase the cost and reduce the
flexibility of international telecommunications operations and significant-
ly hamper trade in goods and services.
A parallel concern, particularly for the United States, is that foreign
PTTs might use their monopoly power to take anticompetitive steps to the
detriment of foreign providers of value-added telecommunication services
and information services not covered by the PTTs' existing monopoly.
Already, the Nordic and Benelux telecommunication authorities have sug-
gested limiting the number of providers of certain new international com-
munication services. 14 United States providers of these services are
concerned that they could be "whipsawed" by foreign PTTs, which might
play foreign suppliers off against each other, thereby shifting the economic
benefits in their favor. There is also concern that foreign PTTs might secure
operating privileges in the United States for their subsidiaries and then
exclude all American competitors from competing for the business of
transmitting information between the United States and their home coun-
tries. 15
Discriminatory Standards
A number of governments have established standards for telecommunica-
tion-related services that depend on public communication facilities. The
establishment of standards can be extremely useful in encouraging the
growth of new types of information and a value-added communication
services. Standards can also be designed to impose an indirect barrier to
foreign companies, or, alternatively, they may be administered in what
appear to be purposefully discriminatory ways. For instance, several coun-
tries have established protocols which cover the bit sequence of the intro-
ductory portion of digital messages. 16 In some cases the choice of
sequences required has greatly impaired the efficiency of foreign as com-
pared to local equipment.
Many governments regulate the extent to which privately-owned
equipment can be connected to the public telecommunications network.
Such regulations can severely limit the type, make, or design of equipment
acceptable for "interfacing" with the domestic communications system. 17
This in turn limits the types of communication and data services that can
be provided on a cost-effective basis to users. Restrictive policies with
respect to the type of equipment which can be plugged into the public
communication network, restrict transborder data flows and distort the
logical development of efficient telecommunication networks. Combatting
this trend, several international and regional organizations are currently
engaged in activities that have as their goal the harmonization of telecom-
munication equipment standards. 18
150 REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS
Restrictions on the Use of Foreign Data Processing Facilities
A number of countries have adopted or are considering legislation that
would restrict the use of computer facilities located in other countries,
either for data processing or for information retrieval. 19 International
economies of scale and technical considerations are such that when foreign
concerns must duplicate their equipment and data processing facilities in
each processing center, many of the benefits that telematics breakthroughs
have provided are lost, and costs to users rise significantly. At the extreme,
of course, governments could require that publicly-available data services
must be provided domestically. Foreign competition then would effective-
ly be shut out.
In reviewing the types of measures that can restrict the flow of informa-
tion across national boundaries or prevent the integration of communica-
tion systems, it should be emphasized that all of these regulations can, at
least theoretically, be justified on many grounds. One critical challenge for
international policymakers is to develop procedures for distinguishing
regulations meant to hamper trade from measures designed for legitimate
purposes which have an unavoidable effect on trade. This task will become
somewhat easier if countries are convinced that, from the perspective of
growth and economic efficiency, everyone benefits from the free flow of
information and communication services. 20 First, however, we need to
examine the explanations countries give for regulating the international
flow of information.
Reasons for Imposing Regulations on Information Flows
Six sometimes overlapping reasons for regulating the use of the interna-
tional communication network and transborder data flows are frequently
articulated.
Data Protection and Privacy
Most countries have adopted data protection laws to safeguard the privacy
of their citizens. 21 Some countries go even further and insist on their right
and duty to protect the privacy of their legal citizens such as corporations
and associations. 22 During the 1970s, data protection to ensure privacy
was the most frequent reason given for regulations affecting transborder
information flows. 23 The enactment of such regulations created considera-
ble concern that they might be used by some governments to restrict
transborder data flows.
The rapid expansion of computer capacity to store and manipulate
extensive data files on individuals has provoked concerns about the poten-
tial for extensive intrusion into personal privacy. Governments, particular-
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ly in Europe, have reacted by instituting laws designed to protect personal
privacy and to ensure that privacy protection is not diminished by the
export of the information. The new OECD privacy guidelines and the
Council of Europe Treaty are attempts to harmonize differing national
approaches to this issue. 24
Actions to Ensure Cultural and Societal Integrity
A number of countries including France, Canada, and a host of Lesser
Developed Countries (LDCs) have also expressed concern about the dilu-
tion of indigenous culture caused by the dissemination of foreign books,
magazines, films, and other materials as well as through the delivery of
television programs via satellite. Governments have adopted a wide variety
of policies to reduce foreign cultural penetration, by limiting the access of
foreign advertising, broadcasting, and publications to their markets. In
recent years advances in modern video and information retrieval tech-
niques have extended considerably the possibility for delivering informa-
tion to people. These advances, in turn, have prompted many governments
to extend their regulation of information flows to the newest technologies.
The seemingly pervasive concern that the spread of foreign data pro-
cessing may subject potentially large sectors of societies to excessive influ-
ence from dominant, alien cultures tacitly underlies these regulations. This
argument has been raised repeatedly by developing countries in the coun-
cils of UNESCO and also by the Canadians and other industrialized coun-
tries with reference to the United States.
Actions to Safeguard National Security and Sovereignty
Most governments, including the United States, maintain measures to
prevent public disclosure of information related to national security. In
general, such laws seek to prevent public disclosure of vital information
and do not seek specifically to prevent its international transfer. In some
cases, however, the result is that the outward flow of technical data is
restricted.
Some governments also argue that consideration of their economic
security requires them to restrict the international transfer of information
about their domestic economic resources. For example, Brazil and other
developing countries have opposed the use of remote sensing systems or
other advanced detection techniques which might provide foreign coun-
tries or companies with oil production data or with better information on
potential deposits and distribution than is available to local authorities. 25
Some governments also restrict the international transfer of certain
types of economic information in order to protect the sovereignty of eco-
nomic activity of their citizens. By denying foreign entities such informa-
tion, governments in general try to make it more difficult for other
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governments to assert extraterritorial regulatory authority over them or
over those operating within their borders.
Laws to Ensure Access to Data Vital to the Public Interest
Many countries require that information necessary to the functioning of
their economies be stored or processed domestically. Government officials
fear that for economic, political, or technological reasons they might be cut
off from critical data or they could be vulnerable to the threat of such a
cut off. Two examples of such measures are frequently cited. First, in
banking, Canada and Germany, for different reasons, require data about
the accounts of their nationals to be stored and processed domestically. 26
Such measures, however, force foreign banks to duplicate at substantial
cost their record processing hardware and software in each country. The
second example is that of the Malmo, Sweden fire department-computer
program. Malmo computerized the plan of the city to help the fire depart-
ment act efficiently during emergencies. The information was stored in a
computer in Cleveland, Ohio and accessed by satellite. Great concern
arose, however, when an electrical failure in Cleveland and a fire in Malmo
occurred simultaneously, preventing Malmo from tapping its data. The
data file was subsequently transferred to Amsterdam. 
27
Protection of User and Consumer Interests Through Public Monopolies
Many governments regulate the access of foreign telecommunications en-
tities to their market to ensure the provision of reasonably priced, reliable
service to their private citizens and corporate users. The United States is
nearly unique in its reliance on market forces to provide not only informa-
tion services but also, to an increasing degree, a wide variety of telecom-
munication services: e.g., long-distance calls or data links. Elsewhere, the
full range of telecommunication services are provided exclusively by gov-
ernment owned, or controlled telecommunication monopolies (PITs) em-
powered to establish fair prices and to provide reliable services. Often, this
mandate requires regulators to distinguish clearly between the regulation
of domestic and international services. Previously, the variety of telecom-
munication links between countries was more limited, with the result that
the distinctions between domestic and international regulation of services
were less significant. With the merger of computer and communication
technologies, however, disparities between domestic and international
regulatory structure have affected transborder data flows.
Rapid advances in technology, and the corresponding decline in the
capital investment required to establish new communication services, have
improved the prospects of smaller firms more efficiently providing special-
ized, international telecommunication services. Some governments fear
that if too many providers of new services gain access to their markets, it
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will be more difficult for them to protect the public interest or to protect
the economic position of their public telecommunication monopolies. For
example, a number of countries are concerned that the international ap-
plication of the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC) deregulatory
efforts under the so-called Computer II Inquiry will subject them to
America's free market competition and undermine their planned com-
munication market. Some of these countries see this FCC action as threat-
ening the domestic authority of their own PTTs. They have stated that
they may retaliate to prevent the deterioration of government control of
their national telematic services. 28 By contrast, Britain, Japan, and Aus-
tralia have reduced regulation and they are experimenting with greater
market competition in an effort to lower costs to users while still providing
reliable services. 
29
Protectionist Actions to Shield Domestic Industries
Countries also erect barriers to transborder data flows and resist integration
with some parts of the telecommunication network to protect domestic
industries from foreign competition. Classic arguments for infant industry
protection are raised to justify restrictions on telecommunications, data
processing, and information services. Countries argue that they must pro-
tect and promote industries which will be central to their future economic
prosperity. Often domestic manufacturers of communication and comput-
er equipment, for example, are protected from foreign competition. Brazil
and some industrial countries attempt to protect their industries by placing
barriers on imports of telecommunication and information equipment and
services. 3
Most industrial countries have largely agreed to limit the establishment
of new tariff barriers. 31 However, most of these countries maintain non-
tariff barriers on the exchange of goods and services, thereby distorting
world trade flows. 32 Ultimately, such barriers may be more damaging to
world trade than explicit impact barriers at the border because when the
transportation, communication, and financial underpinnings of trade are
damaged, all trade, not just the activity of specific sectors, is disrupted. 33
In some cases, the protectionist motive for regulation of trade in com-
munication and information services is explicit; in other cases, govern-
ments claim that their actions fulfill one or more of the other
non-economic goals described earlier. One responsibility of trade policy
officials is to find ways to distinguish measures that serve purely protec-
tionist purposes that distort world trade from those that advance legitimate
social or security goals, so that efforts can be made to limit the enactment
of new obstacles and to remove those currently in force.
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Possible Effects of Regulation on Information Flows
Having reviewed the most common types of regulations and the reasons
normally given for imposing them, we can now analyze the likely impact
of these measures on transborder data flows and on the functioning of the
international communications network.
It is prudent to note, however, that despite the increased attention
devoted to restrictions on information and communication flows, the es-
tablishment of such barriers has not already become a critical situation. 34
Indeed, as policy officials we are trying to promote adjustment to the new
communication and information technologies and strengthen the bases for
free trade in value-added communication and information services to pre-
vent a crisis from arising. To date, companies have managed to continue
their operations with only minimal dislocation of their preferred com-
munication and data-processing activities. New market opportunities have
been somewhat curtailed, though they probably have not been severely
restricted. Unless some sound steps are taken soon, however, at least four
types of negative economic consequences could result.
Disruption of Existing Economic Activities
The most fundamental impact of the continued proliferation of barriers to
trade in communication and information services would be the disruption
of existing international commercial and financial relations. The break-
down of the charge card network or of the SWIFT system used by the
banks would, for example, seriously affect the day-to-day functioning of
world commerce. 35 Similarly, the logistics of the world's air and marine
transportation systems would be threatened by major communication dis-
ruptions or breakdowns.
Impact on Growth of Domestic Economies
Specific cases suggest that government regulation of information flows has
forced many firms to make suboptimal decisions, particularly from a cost
standpoint, regarding information, data processing, and telecommunica-
tion services. 36 For example, some firms have been forced to develop
separate facilities in different countries, thereby increasing their costs,
reducing their efficiency, and perhaps diverting their investments from
more productive uses. Moreover, restrictions on communication and infor-
mation services may influence the operations and planning of other indus-
tries which use them in providing their services or producing their
products.
Business concerns about future actions by governments have probably
had a more adverse economic impact than the actual measures taken by
governments to date. Concern about future restrictions, enhanced by in-
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tense debate in government circles, has induced some enterprises to post-
pone investments in data processing and telecommunication systems and
facilities to the detriment of international trade and economic growth in
general. These reactions to anticipated restrictions have had a real, al-
though difficult to measure, impact on the domestic as well as the interna-
tional structure of industry. Inefficiency which need not have occurred has
crept into the system because of political and protectionist concerns. 37
Impact on Growth of the World Economy
Growth of the world economy depends on trade: As goods and services
related to information and communication are among the most dynamic
sectors of our economies, 38 restricting trade in this area particularly affects
growth opportunities. Barriers to selected international communications,
such as data on market opportunities, on the creditworthiness of individu-
als or commercial enterprises, on debts and assets, or on sales and expendi-
tures, could disrupt future trade and investment. Most countries are
currently experiencing sluggish growth, and limitations on new telematics
trade and investment opportunities could sidetrack efforts to stimulate
domestic and international growth and recovery.
Protective actions taken by a few governments also might start a chain
reaction of restrictions, with governments competing with one another to
defend and promote their perceived interests. Such steps could create
serious political friction among countries and could further disrupt world
trade during a time of tension over issues such as European agricultural
export subsidies, Japanese industrial targeting practices, and widespread
subsidization of exports by developing countries.
Impact on PTT-Private Sector Competition
Communication services between the United States and foreign countries
are provided jointly by private firms on the United States side and national
monopolies on the foreign side. Until recently the Federal Communica-
tions Commission allowed only AT&T to provide international voice ser-
vice, while several International Record Carriers (IRCs) competed to
provide international "enhanced" information services. 39 In 1982, FCC
deregulation permitted for the first time AT&T and the IRCs to compete
head-to-head by deregulating enhanced services and permitting AT&T to
compete to supply these services. 40
Historically, foreign PTTs have negotiated operating agreements with
several American IRCs to provide the same enhanced services along the
same route. To discourage the PTTs from playing one IRC off against
others ("whipsawing"), the FCC maintained a "uniform settlements" poli-
cy, 41 which required all American IRCs providing the same service to the
same foreign point to specify the financial arrangements that were agreed
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upon. To alter the financial arrangements with the PTT, all of these IRCs
had to make the same change simultaneously. American users are con-
cerned, however, that as the FCC has given up some of its regulatory
powers, they may now be more vulnerable to PTT whipsawing on both
new and existing services. In the past, whipsawing of American firms by
foreign PTTs was more difficult to engineer because the IRCs were less
numerous, maintained a large technological edge, and were therefore in a
better bargaining position. The proliferation of new companies and ser-
vices, however, has weakened their bargaining position.
In upholding the Computer II Inquiry in August 1982, the FCC chose
to continue to regulate basic communications services, but to relinquish its
authority to regulate enhanced communications services. The Computer II
decision would permit any person or firm to enter into an operating agree-
ment with a foreign PTT to provide a specific enhanced service without
seeking permission from the FCC. Although the FCC maintains that its
continued authority over the basic services will allow it to respond to
unfair competitive practices by foreign PTTs regarding enhanced services,
the users remain nervous. 42 The United States continues to seek ways to
ensure that American private companies will be able to compete fairly
abroad for new markets. 43
STRATEGIES FOR PRESERVING TRADE
What can we do about the growth of barriers to international trade in
communication, information and data processing services? As we have
pointed out, most barriers are intertwined with legitimate regulatory ac-
tivities of governments, and in order to eliminate these barriers you have
to find a way of separating them from those legitimate regulatory activi-
ties. Moreover, in order to develop the international consensus necessary
to tackle these issues, one has to make it clear that one is not questioning
the legitimacy of the regulatory activity per se, but the avoidable protection-
ist elements of such regulation.
A second point to bear in mind is that the level of restrictions on
transborder data flows that has emerged is still relatively modest as com-
pared to the potential restrictiveness of many proposed regulatory actions.
At the same time, current regulations covering communications activities
in many countries have retarded, but generally not prevented, the intro-
duction of new value-added communication services. It is probably more
important at a governmental level, at least initially, to try to slow down
the introduction of new barriers than to embark on comprehensive
negotiations to remove existing barriers. In most cases, individual firms
have proven themselves capable of working out acceptable accommoda-
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tions with the host governments involved, with occasional support from
their home government on a case by case basis.
Negotiations aimed at the objective of slowing down or preventing the
introduction of new barriers to trade in information and communication
services must take account of the rapid pace of change in the technology,
and the considerable uncertainty faced by government officials concerning
future social issues that might emerge from the introduction of this new
technology. There is a very real danger, that, in the face of rapid change
and uncertainty, any comprehensive agreements that might be negotiated
prematurely could end up creating more restrictions than would exist in
the absence of any agreements. The challenge is to devise a set of negotiat-
ing objectives that will reduce the creation of new barriers, and reduce the
uncertainty now faced by the business community with respect to future
government actions, while not forcing governments to hedge the uncer-
tainty they face through restrictive provisions.
The negotiating strategy the United States government has adopted in
the trade area is to aim initially for agreements on general principles and
procedures to sort out individual cases and to seek to develop, over time,
more comprehensive agreements. An agreement on general principles
would establish a clear direction for government policy, and provide a
basis for sorting out bilateral issues over regulations that have restrictive
effects on trade. It would remove business uncertainty, while not forcing
governments to commit themselves in detail on specific future situations
that are difficult to forsee.
Proposed Data Declaration
The United States has proposed that the industrial countries belonging to
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
agree to minimize the disruption of international information flows, while
recognizing the legitimacy of regulations aimed at social, cultural, and
security objectives. More specifically, the United States has called for a
"Data Declaration" that would be patterned after the 1974 OECD Trade
Pledge. 44
The draft data declaration proposed by the United States reads as fol-
lows:
Recognizing that information, computer and communications policies are
fundamental to economic progress and well-being;
Having completed guidelines for the protection of personal data and having
initiated an examination of the economic and legal aspects of non-personal
information flows;
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Considering that rapid technological advances in this area are transforming
the nature of the world economy, leading to uncertainty as to how govern-
ments might pattern future laws and regulations to keep pace with progress;
Understanding that governments have a special responsibility for taking
measures to provide the public with reliable communications services and in
this respect different countries may have different approaches in discharging
this responsibility;
Recognizing that in pursuing legitimate social goals, governments should
avoid developing laws, policies and practices which would create unneces-
sary obstacles to international trade and information flows;
Recalling the principles and objectives contained in the OECD Convention
and referred to in the Declaration on Trade policy;
AGREE: That the above mentioned state of affairs calls for wide cooperation
in the area of telecommunications, data processing, and information policy;
That current and possible future problems in this area can be significantly
reduced through close consultation among governments regarding issues
raised and the measures that could be adopted to resolve differences;
That the desire to meet the communication and data needs of Member
Countries can best be achieved through an environment which encourages
and rewards innovation.
In addition, these governments would declare their determination: A)
To maintain and improve an open system of international information
flows; B) To avoid restrictive measures which would disrupt the interna-
tional flow of data; impede international trade in telecommunications, data
processing and information services; and inhibit economic growth, pro-
ductivity, and technological innovation; C) To continue efforts to consult
with each other on issues covered by this Declaration in order to further
the achievement of its objectives.
Multilateral Negotiations on Trade in Services
Over the long term, the United States has proposed the preparation of
future multilateral negotiations on trade in services. This proposal was put
forward by the United States at a meeting last November of Trade Minis-
ters representing the eighty-eight contracting parties of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). After considerable debate, the
Ministers agreed to initiate national studies of the issues involved, with the
objective of reaching a decision in 1984 on future negotiations on trade in
services. 45 While the United States government has not decided what its
objectives might be with respect to negotiations covering trade in com-
munication and information services, the possibilities include a regulatory
IMPACT OF REGULATION ON INT'L COMMUNICATIONS 159
code based on the GATT standards code negotiated during the Tokyo
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, an agreement covering the
"Right to Plug Into" global communication systems, an agreement on fair
terms of competition between government communication monopolies
and private firms in the area of value-added communication services and
data/information services, and procedures for the negotiated reduction of
specific barriers.
The Standards Code 46 negotiating during the Tokyo round of GATT
may provide a model for an international agreement designed to assure
that domestic regulations are transparent and administered fairly. The
Standards Code provides some basic principles and a set of domestic and
international procedures to implement them. In brief, it establishes an
obligation to minimize the restrictive effects on trade of domestic stan-
dards by seeking the least distortive design and implementation proce-
dures. It also provides for transparency and due process in the
administration of standards and establishes an international dispute settle-
ments mechanism. In keeping with these obligations, several signatories to
the code have indicated an interest in multilateral negotiations on the issue
of access to the interconnect market. 47
The "right to plug" equipment into the public telecommunications net-
work could be covered by another type of agreement. 48 To protect the
reliability and integrity of the communication system, it is necessary to
establish technical standards for equipment designed to be plugged into
the public telephone system. Governments may elect to negotiate an inter-
national agreement which establishes a "right to plug in" for equipment
that meets agreed technical standards and allows firms to sell services that
can be provided by using such equipment. Such an agreement might be
complementary to work done in the Consultative Committee on Interna-
tional Telephone and Telegraph (CCITT) and the International Standards
Organization (ISO) or might even take place under the auspices of these
organizations.
Competition between government-owned communication monopolies
and privately-owned firms in the area of value-added communication
services and information services could be covered by another agreement.
The key principle underlying such competition could be that government-
owned or controlled communication monopolies should deal with foreign,
private firms on an arms-length, competitive basis.
Foreign suppliers of domestic or imported telematic services should be
treated on the same basis as domestic firms. In general, the interactions
between private firms and national telecommunication monopolies raise
four main issues. 49 First, policymakers need to consider on what basis
domestic PTTs should sell or provide services to others, including foreign
buyers. PTTs might agree to sell or provide their services to foreign and
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domestic-owned purchasers or users on an equivalent basis. Discriminato-
ry practices would arise only if government sellers and providers failed to
treat all purchasers or users identically.
Second, PTTs might agree that when they purchased services they
would allow foreign providers or importers to compete on an equal footing
with domestic suppliers of the service for that particular sale. While con-
tinuing to preserve some portion of the business to satisfy domestic securi-
ty concerns, PTTs might nonetheless encourage competition for contracts
from foreign-owned suppliers of information and communication services.
This idea is roughly analagous to the principles embodied in the Govern-
ment Procurement Code5 0 negotiated during the Tokyo round trade
negotiations, which could also be applied to telematic services in addition
to goods.
Third, to the extent that PTTs compete directly with domestic and
foreign suppliers of services, they might agree to do so on an arms-length,
commercial basis. PTTs could conceivably agree to conduct their business
to the extent possible in a manner compatible with Article XVII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 51 In practice, this would
mean that PTTs would agree to forego their monopoly bargaining position
in most cases in order to allow competition to produce efficient, effective
service for users and consumers.
Fourth, in pricing public telecommunication services, PTT's might agree
not to discriminate among users, except when justified by differences in
the costs of providing such services. PTT's would also agree to set rates on
international communication services that reflected the costs of providing
such services. In other words, PTT's would agree not to use exorbitantly
high rates as a means of discouraging the international flow of data.
Barriers to trade in communication and information services might also
be liberalized by inclusion in a broader negotiating framework for trade in
services. Such an overall approach has been outlined in articles by Ambas-
sador William E. Brock, the current United States Trade Representative. 52
Under these proposals, governments would agree (1) to notify all regulato-
ry measures which were designed to protect domestic industries; i.e., all
barriers would be made transparent; 53 (2) to accept the application of the
national treatment principle to all regulations not notified as barriers; i.e.,
all domestic and foreign companies covered by the regulations would
receive equally favorable treatment; and (3) all regulations notified as
barriers would be subject to negotiated reductions or removal.
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CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Our hope is that sometime in the present decade the United States and
other trading countries will have proceeded far enough in creating a trade
regime covering services to permit them to reduce multilaterally existing
barriers to trade in services, including telematics services. The United
States will, of course, continue to work on a case-by-case and bilateral
basis to remove the most serious obstacles to trade in services but, ulti-
mately, if the trading system is to grow dynamically, countries will have
to address barriers to trade on a multilateral basis for the full range of
services. A considerable amount of work still lies ahead before we can
develop concrete proposals on how to approach future negotiations or
before we know precisely what part telematics services will play in those
negotiations. The most desirable structure for negotiations will emerge
only once we have made progress in building a conceptual base for trade
in services. Progress toward ensuring continued free trade in telematics
services is particularly important because the coming years will be the most
important for the evolution of the world trading system since the creation
of the GATT'. Countries need to improve international cooperation on
trade in goods, but they also need to focus on trade in services before it
becomes the crisis of tomorrow. Telematics services may well be the foun-
dation for the long-term stability of the trading system. Industrial nations
already entering the information era have a special stake in making sure
that trade in telematics services expands and continues to contribute to
world economic vitality. Improved international economic cooperation de-
pends on the international financial, transportation, and above all com-
munication systems. It is imperative that these systems remain integrated.
So long as national leaders commit themselves to support the international
trading system, including the new trade in telematic and other services, the
prospects for growth, prosperity, and cooperation will be stronger than
ever.
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